Background: There is much interest in understanding how using bundled primary care payments to support a patient-centered medical home (PCMH) affects total medical costs.
W e examine changes in costs during the first 2 years of a primary care practice transformation and payment reform initiative started in 2009 by the Capital District Physicians' Health Plan (CDPHP), a not-for-profit network health plan in upstate New York. This patient-centered medical home (PCMH) pilot is of great interest as a "virtual all-payer" innovation, 1 with practices encouraged to change treatment protocols for everyone, regardless of payer or benefit design. We examined whether the pilot saved money.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation has funded several pilots and demonstrations to increase value in health care spending. 2 One strategy is to encourage primary care practices to become "patient-centered medical homes," within which teams of clinical professionals use electronic medical records 3, 4 to sustain the health of a specified panel of patients. 5 Ideally, payments to practices support coordinated, preventive care that reduces avoidable utilization. [6] [7] [8] The PCMH may save money while maintaining or improving quality. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] However, the best-studied pilots have involved integrated managed care plans, including Kaiser Permanente, the Veterans Health Administration, and Geisinger Health Plan with salaried primary care practitioners (PCPs) and other organizational features uncommon in the United States. 14, 15 Other pilots have primarily retained fee-for-service (FFS) payment with a small coordination and management supplement 16 ; few have used models to substantially adjust payments or bonuses for differences in patient risk.
In 2009, 3 electronic medical records-enabled practices with at least 35% of their workloads covered by CDPHP volunteered for its PCMH pilot. Collectively, they employ 14 physicians and 4 other professional staff. 1 CDPHP implemented risk-adjusted base payments and outcomes-based bonuses as advocated by Goroll et al 17 and developed by Ash and Ellis, 18 and Ellis and Ash. 19 In the new system, 63% of the payments were calculated as a risk-adjusted "bundle," 27% as bonus, and only 10% by FFS. Novel features of this pilot include: linked practice transformation and payment reform; diverse plan types and payers; and CDPHP not owning hospitals or specialist practices, yet unilaterally selffinancing this transformation. Although this pilot officially ended in 2010, CDPHP has since expanded this PCMH model to additional primary care practices. 1 
METHODS

Data and Methodology
We analyzed practices in Albany, Rensselaer, Saratoga, and Schenectady counties, where CDPHP's 3 pilot (treatment) practices draw the most patients. We use eligibility, provider, medical, and pharmacy claims data for the years 2007 to 2010, and the Massachusetts Health Quality Project assignment algorithm described by Song et al 20 
Difference in Difference Specification
To identify the effect of the PCMH on spending, we estimated
where i indicates a patient; j indicates his/her assigned practice; and t indicates year. The dependent variable: S is annualized spending; D is the treatment dummy; and t 09 and t 10 are time-period dummies for 2009 and 2010 (in contrast to 2008), respectively. The vector X contains individual characteristics including dummies for: Medicare and Medicaid versus the reference category of "privately insured"; health maintenance organization, preferred provider organization and point of service versus FFS; and administrative services only versus non-administrative services only contracts. Fixed-effect l i capture patient health status. Standard errors are clustered at the practice level. We modeled the effects of the PCMH using both fixed-PCP and changing-PCP assignment; fixed-assignment estimates are robust to post-implementation changes in patient mix. We used propensity score weights to address imbalances. That is, we first modeled the probability that a person is "treated," 21 then weighted each observation by that probability, using the proportional "overlap weight" 22 from a logistic model using age, sex, plan type, and payer type. We replicated the Song et al 20 algorithm, weighting separately within each study year to achieve comparable (propensity-weighted) mean values of all predictor variables in the control and treatment groups each year ( Table 1 , first and third columns). We also follow the Medicare program's method of annualizing spending, and weighting each person-year observation by the fraction of the year he/she is eligible. 23 Plan members could receive care from any practice at any time, potentially changing their ex post practice assignment. Indeed, 2889 members had their assigned PCP changed between control and treatment practices during 2008 to 2010. As switching could be endogenous to medical home implementation, our primary analysis assigned each person to their 2008 practices and omitted enrollees who enter and exit; an online supplement also reports results from other assignment and selection methods. As a sensitivity analysis, we also present results using an alternative propensity scoring approach.
Propensity Score Analysis
RESULTS
We first examined changes over 2 years in the (raw) sample means of spending in treatment and control groups, adjusting only for fractional-year eligibility (the data are in the third from bottom row of Table 1 ). Average cost increased by $442 from 2008 to 2010 for controls, versus $386 (ie, $56 less growth) for those treated. Table 1 shows both the changing composition and spending of the treatment and control groups. Analogous findings from 2008 to 2009 are similar: in the pilot's first year, treatment group average costs grew by $48 less than in the control group. As these estimates do not control for changes in insurance and who is assigned to the treatment practices, we next used regression analysis with patient-level fixed effects, multiple plan-type controls, and propensity score weighting. Table 2 summarizes findings from 2 fixed-effects, difference-in-difference models using weighted least squares; one used fixed-PCP and the other changing-PCP assignment. Each person-year observation during 2008, 2009, or 2010 is weighted by the individual's eligible months during that year multiplied by their propensity score, with standard errors clustered by practice. These models differ in how they assign a patient year to the treatment or control group. Our preferred model (first 2 columns) uses Fixed 2008 PCP Assignment, as of 2008, prior to implementation, and excludes new entrants and exiters. Thus, it "holds treatment practices accountable" for all care received by their 2008 patients, even when latter care is delivered by a non-PCMH practice; a PCMH does not "get credit" for lowering costs by shedding difficult patients or selectively recruiting healthy ones. With this specification, estimated savings were $198 in the first 12 months (P = 0.20) and $289 in the second year (P = 0.15).
The second model in Table 2 uses Changing-PCP Assignment. Although, patients can enter, exit, or be reassigned to a new practice yearly with this specification, point estimates for average treatment effect estimates remain similar in magnitude (À $186 in year 1 and À $297 in year 2), and not statistically significant. A range of model variants, included in the supplementary material, produce similar findings: that is, similarly large, and nonstatistically significant point estimates for the treatment effect in each year.
Although total estimated yearly cost savings are not statistically significant, some subsets of spending are. Sticking with our Fixed 2008 PCP Assignment method, Table 3 presents year 1 and year 2 treatment effect estimates resulting from 16 alternative specifications. Estimated savings change little when omitting controls, focusing on only primary care specialties, or non-pediatric primary care specialties. No statistically significant savings appear by payer type, although there is a hint of smaller savings on Medicaid enrollees relative to Medicare and privately-insured enrollees. Estimated emergency department treatment effects are statistically significant (À 11.0%, P = 0.01) in year 1 and remain meaningful (À 9.6%, P = 0.12) in year 2. Looking at 6 outpatient service components, statistically significant reductions were found for evaluation and management visits (À 3.4%, P = 0.00 in year 1; À 6.5%, P = 0.00 in year 2) and laboratory tests (À 16.5%, P = 0.02 in year 2). We also estimated models with CDPHP's patient assignment algorithm, which uses the health maintenance organizations' reported PCP assignment when available before applying an algorithm that favors primary care specialties over non-primary care specialties. Those results (Appendix B, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links. lww.com/MLR/A582) also point toward savings, but less strongly than those shown here.
Treatment and control practice samples differ in average risk scores, calculated by applying Verisk Health's DxCG prospective risk adjustment model to prior-year data ( Table 1) . Mean risk scores start lower and grow less rapidly for treatment versus control patients, particularly after propensity score weighting. That is, the claims data suggest that treatment group patients start healthier and accumulate illnesses less rapidly than these controls.
To estimate savings while holding "health status" (risk scores) constant, we added the diagnosis-based prospective risk score from the previous year to the propensity score predictors used elsewhere in this paper. This propensity model provides weights for the controls that additionally adjust for observed differences in risk between treated and control patients. Detailed findings from replicating the regressions of Table 3 (but using the new weights) are in Appendix C ( Supplementary Table C -1, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/A582); this specification generally finds larger effects and improved statistical significance. With this model, for example, estimated savings in year 1 and year 2 grow to $286 (8.8%, P = 0.06) and $318 (9.8%, P = 0.11), respectively; other estimates also become larger and P-values for savings drop toward, and below, the 0.05 level for Medicare beneficiaries, inpatient care, and imaging. One concern with these analyses is that apparent differences in health status between treatment and control practices could be endogenous. 24 For example, a PCMH might generate fewer nuisance visits (and illness coding) of the type that FFS billing encourages; conversely, a PCMH might proactively identify diseases that remain "hidden" in less intensively managed patients. Because of the concerns about the comparability of coding for treatment and control patients, we have highlighted the Table 3 difference-in-differences estimates that address risk without measuring risk-by using each person as their own control.
DISCUSSION
We performed many analyses, varying the sample, the duration of eligibility required for inclusion, practice assignment algorithms, fixed-assignment versus variableassignment rules, using and not using explicit measures of patient risk, and examining total spending versus several of its parts. Although virtually all estimates of all outcomes showed savings, the amount varied considerably and almost never achieved significance at the 0.05 level. Our most credible model (with individual fixed effects and multiple control variables in the continuously enrolled sample) suggests reductions in health care spending growth on the order of 6% to 8% and large, statistically significant percentage reductions in emergency department (11.0%) and laboratory use (16.5%) after changing incentives for primary care providers in these newly created PCMHs.
Such reductions in total health care spending, if real, would have covered CDPHP's 1-time $35,000 stipend to encourage transformation and annual performance bonuses of up to $50,000 per physician, 1 although transformation costs were subsidized by CDPHP and its implementation partners, TransforMed and Verisk Health, making full costs hard to calculate. 1 Cost analyses should be revisited in a greatly expanded set of "treatment" practices.
This study has weaknesses. It describes only 3 selfselected practices during an initial 2 years of practice transformation and payment reform, with an evolving bonus system. Furthermore, even extensive modeling of limited data are no substitute for a larger sample; the very existence of savings remains a tentative finding.
Nevertheless, the apparent PCMH effects are large, and patterns of suggested savings in inpatient services and selected outpatient services are plausible. As CDPHP expands its medical home pilot, its effect on clinical quality, patient satisfaction, and costs will remain of keen interest. Each row is for a different regression. All models weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores; standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual fixed effects. In addition, models 5 to 7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, whereas the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type, and payer type.
*Clinical categories designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only. Physician assignment is based on Massachusetts Health Quality Project Primary Care Practitioner assignment algorithm.
